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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the First World War, the practice of football underwent rapid
development in continental Europe as a professional sport as well as a new
diplomatic instrument. This article aims to analyse the role and the
involvement of Swiss football leaders in this context of commercialisation,
mediatisation and politicisation, from the 1930s to 1954, when in the same
year Swiss officials organised the World Cup and held the Basel congress,
which laid the first stone of a European governing body: the Union des
Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA). The analysis of those officials’
involvement stresses the importance of the role played by Switzerland in the
administration of the game (the headquarters of the Fédération Internationale
de Football Association have been based in Zurich since 1932, the UEFA
moved to Bern in 1960), in the organisation of a great number of
international games and competitions for clubs (Coupe of Nations in 1930)
and national teams (World Cup in 1954), but also more broadly in the
international relations, where sport – and especially football – was
increasingly used as a tool of diplomacy in changing geopolitical configuration.
Introduction
The last few years have seen significant developments in the study of the place
of football in European societies. Historians, as well as economists and soci-
ologists, have been trying to show that, since the inter-war years, this practice
has brought together the continent’s inhabitants and that it is a vector for the
construction of European identity1 and a form of Europeanisation.2 As such,
it would appear of interest to prolong this dynamic by focusing on the actors
(administrators and officials, football associations, states, etc.) who have con-
tributed to this process, not only for motives linked to the expression of ideol-
ogies,3 as a tool of diplomacy,4 but also as a manifestation of economic
interests.5
On that basis, this article aims to analyse the role of Switzerland and its top
football administrators and officials in the development of their sport in
Europe from the middle of the inter-war period up to 1954 when the
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European governing body UEFA was founded. These officials’ involvement
also shows the importance of the role played by Switzerland in the adminis-
tration of the beautiful game (FIFA, the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association, has had its headquarters there since 1932 and UEFA
since 1960), in the number of matches played by the Swiss national
team since the inter-war period; and finally in the hosting of important
competitions on Swiss soil (the European Nations Cup in 1930, the World
Cup in 1954, the European Championship in 2008). We start from the
premise that the attitude of Swiss officials corresponds to a position of
mediator as exercised by the Swiss Confederation on the international
stage. In this sense, the Swiss government, since the inter-war period, has
encouraged investment in areas considered a priori less political, such as
culture6 and science,7 in order to assert its independence in international
relations, in particular by improving its image as a benefactor vis-à-vis
other nations.
In this context, sport – and particularly football – could also be used to
satisfy the same interests. That said, despite its popularity, it has only rarely
been put under the microscope by historians, even if pioneer studies by
Pierre Lanfranchi8 and Christian Koller,9 and more recent publications give
useful food for further thought on the role of Switzerland in the emergence
of football as a European-wide phenomenon,10 by following the directions,
it should be said, indicated by Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young in
their state-of-the-art review of the historiography of European sport.11
To back up our analyses, we have used documents (such as minutes of
management committees, or correspondence between members) from the
archival collections of the Swiss Football Association (ASFA – Association
Suisse de Football et Athlétisme) and of FIFA. We have cross-referenced
these finding with the institutional archives found in the collections of the
Swiss Confederation’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The study would not
have been complete without our reading of the country’s various mainstream
newspapers (La Gazette de Lausanne and la Tribune de Genève) as well as the
specialist sporting press (Le Sport Suisse).
1930–1938: new commitment to European Football
Emerging from the First World War, the practice of football underwent rapid
development in Europe against the background of the commercialisation and
mediatisation of its elite form. Switzerland participated in this phenomenon,
seeing the building of numerous stadiums, the creation of a national cup com-
petition and a trend towards a monopoly by the ASFA of the administration
of the game across the whole of the national territory.12 Internationally, Swiss
officials became very active in establishing lasting exchanges, over and above
tensions left over from the war, as shown by the organisation of a
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Switzerland–Germany match in 1920.13 This ambition was made possible by
Swiss neutrality, recognised since the London Conference of 1815 and con-
firmed by the Treaty of Versailles (1919) in its Article 435.14 However, in
the 1930s, the type of neutrality adopted by the government was ‘differential’,
allowing involvement in international organisations and participation in
international exchanges and trade. Thus, Switzerland took part in discussions
within the League of Nations (LN), created after the end of the war and whose
headquarters was based in Geneva.
Switzerland hosts FIFA’s administrative headquarters
Until the end of the 1920s, FIFA had no offices of its own; the personal resi-
dence of the secretary and treasurer, the Dutchman, Carl Hirschman, doubled
up as the secretariat, as indeed was the case for many other international
sports institutions of the time. However, the 1929 financial crisis, on top of
which, two years later, the devaluation of the British pound brought about
radical changes: through poor investments Hirschman was ruined. He had
not distinguished in his accounts between his personal wealth and the
monies of FIFA, which, as a result, found itself in financial difficulties. The
Dutch official’s ‘personal’ bankruptcy was the decisive event in the creation
of a salaried post of general secretary, and Hirschman was asked to leave
his post. Following a call for applications by the executive committee,15 Ivo
Schricker, from Germany, was appointed to the position; for a time he had
been one of the two FIFA vice-presidents. The appointment of this diligent
official was to prove fundamental to the administrative development of the
Federation. In parallel, and following the wishes of the German Felix Linne-
mann, the Austrian Hugo Meisl and the Italian Giovanni Mauro, the decision
was taken to establish the headquarters of the institution in Zurich as opposed
to Paris, the location supported by the French President of FIFA, Jules Rimet.
The arguments put forward by these individuals in favour of Zurich are
especially significant since they refer both to Switzerland’s central geographi-
cal position and to the advantages the country gains from its political neu-
trality.16 Basing the institution in Switzerland was to prove important in
maintaining the permanence of FIFA’s structure, because of the country’s
good means of communication, which allowed the secretary to interact
with the member associations, as did its neutrality, which protected FIFA
from the vicissitudes of the international context, as it did during the
Second World War. Its exoneration from taxes, negotiated by FIFA, tends
moreover to show there already existed on the part of the Swiss authorities
a determination to help establish such organisations on its territory.
The transfer of the International Federation’s headquarters gave an early
indication of the central position acquired by Switzerland in European foot-
ball – FIFA in the period was still in majority composed of associations
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from the old continent17 – and more generally in the sporting world since the
International Olympic Committee had installed itself on the banks of Lake
Geneva in Lausanne in 1915.18 Additionally, by increasing the number of
matches it played, Swiss football administrators sought to make Switzerland
a country central to the playing of the game.
From the ‘Coupe des nations’ to the Mitropa Cup
In 1930, the country hosted the ‘Coupe des nations’,19 a competition that took
place at the time of the inauguration of the new facilities of the Servette de
Genève club, le Stade des Charmilles, which also allowed the club’s 40th anni-
versary to be celebrated.20 The tournament provided an opportunity for the
Hentsch family, famous merchant bankers, to show their support for the
club by presenting the town with facilities that would thereafter allow it to
host matches played by the national team.
The term ‘Coupe des nations’, ordinarily reserved for matches between
national teams, is testimony to the organisers’ search for grandeur and pres-
tige. The tenor of the event was picked up by the French-language weekly Le
Sport Suisse, which could not refrain from superlatives in its article of 25 June
1930: ‘This event far outstrips anything we have previously seen in football in
Switzerland, and the days from 28 June to 6 July will certainly have a world-
wide impact’.21 At the same time, the German paper Kicker even called it ‘Die
Genfer Kleine Olympiade’ [Geneva’s little Olympiad],22 a comment that seems
to bear witness to the European-wide impact of the event. As to the partici-
pants invited – clubs from the best leagues in Europe – it has to be admitted
that the standard of competition was ‘spicy’.23 Moreover, regarding its Euro-
pean-ness, the tournament was exceptional in an era when competitions
hardly ever surpassed the ‘regional’ level. Thus, even an event like the
Mitropa Cup, which in the mid-1930s was spread over several months and
invited up to 18 teams, remained limited to Central Europe, although it
was covered by the sports press in countries not participating, such as
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Switzerland, involved in the Mitropa Cup in 1936 and 1937, with respect-
ively four, then two club teams, had also taken part from 1927 onwards in the
International Cup, an international competition for national teams from Italy,
Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.24 Over a two-year period, at least, the
various teams met twice on a home and away basis in each tournament; it
could be described as the European competition with the most at stake in
the inter-war period, in terms of level of development of the game played
in the different participating countries. From the start, the football committee
of the ASFA, represented by its President, Jakob Schlegel, and another
member, Jacques Bertschinger, took part in discussions to devise the compe-
tition, in meetings held in Venice in July 1927.25
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This participation by Switzerland in a ‘Central Europe of football’26 may
appear surprising from the point of view of results,27 but it fits into a geopolitical
stance that goes beyond football, ‘being overwhelmingly central European in its
orientation,with a healthy regard for Italianpatronage’.28 Its participation,which
was never called into question between thewars,29 underlined the particular pos-
ition the country occupied in Europe and the will of Switzerland’s leaders to knit
close footballing linkswith otherEuropeannations. This stancewas toprove par-
ticularly strong in the months to come, particularly when seen in the context of
the increasing tensions across the continent of Europe.
1938–1944: staying neutral and playing football
From 1937 onwards, the Swiss government – in parallel to similar actions
undertaken by the Scandinavian states – called into question its policy of
‘differential’ neutrality, moving to a policy called ‘integral’ neutrality, which
was meant to ensure the security of the country in a geopolitical landscape
that was becoming ever more troubled.30 This change was guided by the
Swiss desire to end their support for the economic sanctions decided by the
League of Nations towards Italy after its invasion of Ethiopia. On the other
hand, this return to greater political autonomy also took account of the inter-
national institution’s weaknesses since Germany and Japan had left it in 1935
and Italy was losing interest in it since giving up its membership on 11
December 1937.31 This realignment of the Swiss Confederation’s diplomacy,
accepted by the Council of the League of Nations on 14 May 1938, allowed the
country to reaffirm its ambition to position itself equidistantly between the
two blocs that seemed to be emerging in the continent of Europe.
Swiss football and neutrality
Moments of international tension were useful for using football as a medium
for updating the national ‘imaginary’, the nation’s collective cultural memory,
and so newspaper commentaries around international matches tell us that
political stakes were never far away from the touchline. Thus, at the World
Cup qualifying match against Portugal played in Milan on 1 May 1938, the
Swiss players opted out of the Fascist salute just before the game started
and set off an ‘explosion of anger’32 among the Milanese spectators who
went so far as to threaten the Swiss fans as they left the stadium. Similarly,
the Swiss achievement against ‘Greater Germany’ in the first round of the
World Cup on 4 and 9 June 1938 was angled in the media by the use of stereo-
types of German physical and scientific play and of the Swiss being organised
into their celebrated tactical defensive system called ‘le Verrou’ – meaning
‘deadlock’,33 an allegorical transposition onto the football pitch of the ideol-
ogy of the ‘national bastion’ or stronghold.34
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Swiss results were admittedly much better in the years 1936 to 1938, due to
the tactics of manager Karl Rappan, from Austria, and to several talented
players – some, like the striker ‘Xam’ Abbeglen, playing their club football
abroad – as well as to experience acquired between 1933 and 1938 in the dom-
estic professional league.35 However, these results alone cannot explain the
activism of Swiss football administrators on the international sports scene.
Indeed, despite the increasingly tense circumstances and ever greater instru-
mentalisation of sport by political regimes, officials pursued sports traditions
established in the 1920s and kept alive the ideal of sport as a vehicle for rap-
prochement between peoples, which encouraged them to support both a
pacifist doctrine and a commitment to nationalism.36
Switzerland and a new geopolitical balance of power, European
football during the Second World War
Switzerland maintained its neutrality throughout the Second World War,37
but unlike countries such as Belgium, Denmark, or the Netherlands it did
not suffer invasion by Axis forces. The country’s neutrality was twofold: it
was ‘defensive’ when neutrality led the government to devise a politico-mili-
tary strategy of national withdrawal (‘repli national’) within the Alpinemassif,
but it did not prevent it keeping one eye looking outwards, as recalled by the
Head of the Political Department in November 1942:
… [firmness in the policy of neutrality] is forced upon us by our position, our
national structure (economically and politically), our history, our mentality,
our three races, our three languages, etc. That is axiomatic. But it is also incon-
testably in the interests of the community of peoples, not least in Europe –
though this is less directly visible. This community cannot go on forever
tearing itself apart: there lies universal ruination. We can, without egotism,
without ulterior motives, without hurting anyone, be useful to everybody,
according to circumstances, and maintain a minimum of international
relations, which, after all, everyone needs.38
In this ‘minimum’ of international relations, the national football team
played an unusual role, since from 1940 to 1943 it took part in over a
dozen matches across Europe, despite the geopolitical transformations
brought about by the German armies’ successive invasions. In fact, just
behind Nazi Germany, which used football as a means of promoting its
power on the continent,39 Switzerland was the country that played the
most matches during this period. One only has to read the newspapers of
the time to see the different meanings conferred on these matches: they
confirm Paul Dietschy’s analysis, which has revealed wide variation:
‘From symbolic confrontations between peoples, through revenge for
years of occupation, to bringing peoples back together, a wide range of feel-
ings and interpretations could be called upon’.40
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First of all, the matches were opportunities to celebrate sporting traditions
that, in many cases, had been damaged in the conflict. Thus, in May 1943, the
match between Switzerland and Hungary gave a journalist, Emile Grêt of Le
Sport Suisse, the opportunity to bemoan how rare international matches had
become and to express his delight at the forthcoming game:
[T]he event [ ] next Sunday, will attract sports fans from thewhole of Switzerland
to the Parc des Sports des Charmilles [… ]. For us, Hungary, although not one of
our oldest adversaries, is none the less–with France, Germany and Italy – one the
nations with whom we have had the most continuing international contacts.41
Whereas these matches were treated as a sign of a return to the normality –
albeit for only the 90 minutes of a game of football – that had prevailed
before the war, they also allowed contacts to be maintained with countries
bloodied by the conflict. This stance could be found especially in matches
against different French national teams.42 During the war, playing against
France was an act of diplomacy, as confirmed in a letter to the Federal
Council from the head of the Swiss delegation present in Lyon on 16 Novem-
ber 1941 for a match against ‘la France Libre’,43 i.e. a match played by the
Swiss B team in the unoccupied zone and not against a team representing
the ‘Free French’. In this letter the delegate mentioned that the ‘Swiss
players and officials have returned home touched by all the signs of gratitude
showered upon them and they understand better than in the past the huma-
nitarian task that is their homeland’s duty to take on in these difficult times
that the world is going through’.44
Additionally, the Swiss press talked about ‘a symbolic match [… ], the first
football match on a French pitch involving a French national team, although
selected solely from the Unoccupied Zone [Vichy France], against a foreign
national team’.45 Regarding a match in Marseille in March 1942, between
the two national A teams, a journalist highlighted the fact that the local popu-
lation had come in such numbers to show ‘their feelings towards Helvetia as
their benefactress’.46 Then, a few weeks later, for the return match between the
Swiss B team and the French team representing ‘la France Libre’ played on 27
May 1942 in Lausanne, the same newspaper presented the event’s significance
from the diplomatic angle:
In normal times an international match takes on great importance, especially
from the sporting point of view. In current circumstances, it has even greater
importance since it provides an opportunity for citizens of friendly countries
to meet, despite the many difficulties, to fraternise, to talk about the past and
to sketch out future projects. It is a welcome reunion, and one made for expres-
sing the warm feelings shared by two peoples.47
However, it was difficult to keep on playing matches against some of
Switzerland’s historic opponents, such as Italy for example, who had not
played since 1941. Nor was it easy to organise matches against more distant
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non-belligerents such as Sweden or Portugal, because of the difficulties of
travel abroad. That being the case, in order to continue playing, the Swiss
team was forced to find new opponents, who emerged through the geopoliti-
cal reconfiguration of Europe. So, the Swiss played three matches against the
national side of Croatia, a Nazi Germany satellite state created after the inva-
sion of Yugoslavia.48 These matches may have had a sporting justification, but
they also carried a very important, hidden political dimension, since in those
times of uncertainty the aim was to make contacts with this country, as an ally
of Germany, a belligerent that looked as though it was emerging victorious
from the war. However, unlike ‘classic’ encounters against neighbours –
Germany, France, Italy, even Hungary49 – comments on these matches
recalled the difficulties of the geopolitical context and they were reported
through nostalgic spectacles. So, whereas the match of 21 April 1940 was
reported in Le Sport Suisse as a proper international match, it was not
described favourably; the journalist Emile Birnbaum – one of the most
admired sporting wordsmiths of his day – lost his temper:50
It was almost a sin to sacrifice my Sunday afternoon for a football match [… ].
However, in Switzerland there are always some 15,000 fellows – like us – who
feel lost if there is a match on and they don’t go. [… ]. [There are no more]
matches against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway and Denmark,
little Tom Thumbs gobbled up raw by the ogre. But now there are these
new-born countries, the offspring of fear and confusion: Slovakia, Croatia
and goodness knows who coming along behind – Bessarabia, Ukraine51
As month followed month, the political ambiguity of opponents became more
problematic. Thus, when the destiny of the war began to change direction, the
Swiss government intervened with the ASFA and got its officials, after one
final Swiss–Croatia game played in the early months of 1943, to agree
‘there [would] be no return match in Croatia’.52
In 1944, with the situation in Europe turning delicate, the national side, la
Nati, played not a single international game in the calendar year – an extre-
mely rare event in its history. The Allied offensives were succeeding in limit-
ing opportunities to travel on the continent. Europe was to emerge from the
war a year later, but it was battered and bloodied and many football admin-
istrators put on record their deep resentment towards the Germans, whom
they considered responsible for the war and whose armies and militia, they
believed, had committed awful atrocities.
1945–1955: becoming a major actor on the changing European
stage
In the months following the end of the conflict in Europe, discussions were
held inside the Swiss government about the international standing of the
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country.53 Unlike the decisions made in the early 1920s, the country decided
not to take part in projects that might be too political in character and thus
preferred to stay in the background regarding the creation of the United
Nations Organisation. Similarly, Switzerland was hardly concerned in discus-
sions within the European movement54 and did not join the Council of
Europe, set up in 1949, until 1963. The Swiss Confederation was concentrat-
ing therefore on maintaining a strong neutrality, i.e. getting involved only in
projects that could not weaken its position and which, on the other hand, were
bound to strengthen its position as a mediator on the international stage.55
Geneva kept its position as an international centre of diplomacy,56 de facto,
by providing homes for part of the UN administration and then, at the begin-
ning of the 1950s for the European Centre for Culture and CERN (the Euro-
pean Centre for Nuclear Research).
Swiss football’s administrators, in their activities at the European level,
again took their lead from the Swiss Confederation’s political stance. The
national team, indeed, played 16 matches from 1945 to 1947, more than its
neighbours who played a dozen at the very most. The relief of being able to
put the agonies of war behind them and the joy of meeting old adversaries
again gave a particular savour to the matches against France, Italy and
Austria in early 1946. In the same vein, Swiss officials were to play an
unusual role vis-à-vis Germany.
Reconciliation and the normalisation of international relations
In 1945, from the ‘political’ point of view, Germany no longer existed; it was
divided into four military zones, administered by the war victors, France,
Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. Acknowledging the dis-
appearance of German football’s national governing body (Deutscher Fußball
Bund), the FIFA congress of 1946 decided to follow the recommendation of its
executive committee and, following their own rules, excluded Germany from
the International Federation. Indeed, Article 6 of FIFA’s statutes forbade
matches with national football associations that were not affiliated
members.57 Yet, discussions became very emotional, with arguments citing
Article 2 of the statutes, recalling the requirement to maintain friendly
relations between members58 – which seemed no longer possible with the
Germans. The position of Germany appeared nonetheless unusual since
sporting friendships prevailed with other countries where fascist regimes
had held sway, such as Austria, Italy and Norway. Their federations were
quickly reintegrated into FIFA59 and they were able to play matches again.
All the same, the complete exclusion of Germany did not command unan-
imous support and, in particular, was not supported by Switzerland. Several
representatives wished to encourage the resumption of sporting relations
with their German counterparts, citing the long tradition of football
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between the two countries. In addition, they thought football should not be
guided by political considerations, but instead should be used to bring
peoples together. Indeed, football, as a major sport in Germany, quickly
regained its rightful place in the country, despite the difficult living conditions.
Already in 1946, British soldiers of the 53rd Division stationed on the Rhine
had played a few games against German XIs, sometimes in front of crowds of
several thousand.60 In summer 1947, within FIFA, Schricker was able to
inform his vice-president, Seeldrayers, that matches had even taken place
between Swiss and German border towns, even though this flouted the Inter-
national Federation’s ban. FIFA nonetheless stood firm on the issue and in
September 1947 the executive committee reminded anyone willing to listen
that matches against German clubs were not tolerated any more than the
transfer of German players was.61 Strong resentment towards Germany was
obviously still held by some members of FIFA’s executive committee, and
especially by the Belgian Seeldrayers.62
As month followed month, the ASFA came under pressure from some
of its regional associations who wanted to start playing against their
German neighbours again, or at least against teams located along the
border where there was a tradition of such games, as there was at international
level. In addition, on 28 July 1948, the ASFA received a formal request
from the American military government of the Baden-Württemberg region
to organise matches between German and Swiss teams, since these encoun-
ters, according to American authorities, would be beneficial ‘to train and
reorient German youth and sports officials’.63 This request was an acknowl-
edgement of the Swiss desire to resume matches with Germany and also
testimony to the reputation built up by Switzerland on the European footbal-
ling scene.64
Even though the ASFA filed a formal request with FIFA for clubs to be able
to play the desired matches, even if they were to be ‘charity matches’, the 1948
congress in London reiterated the ban on Germany, despite Jules Rimet’s affir-
mations about the spiritual union that must bind football associations
together. A few weeks later, however, the International Federation did
begin to cede ground – by giving exceptional permission to the sports direc-
torate in the French Occupation Zone to organise friendly matches between
French and German teams.65
Swiss football administrators, notably, GustavWiederkehr,66 were not slow
to use this breach in FIFA’s defences. Trying to force the issue, they organised
three matches for October 1948 between German and Swiss towns: Stuttgart
vs. Zürich, Karlsruhe vs. Basel and Munich vs. Saint Gallen. These ‘charity’
matches – a status, as Heather Dichter has pointed out, that did not
prevent Swiss football officials looking to make a profit67 – demonstrate
that the aim was not only to update the state of sporting relations between
the two countries, but also to make a political signal in favour of Germany’s
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reappearance on the international stage. As a consequence, a meeting took
place on 20 September 1948 between general secretary Schricker and the pre-
sident of the Swiss Football Association, Ernst Thommen. This led to the
games being denounced by FIFA and the ASFA.68 However, the matches
did take place, and the Swiss association was forced to impose a heavy fine
(500 Swiss francs) on the organisers while strong feelings ‘against’ the
matches were still being shown, especially in countries in the Soviet sphere
of influence.69
This decision meant the ASFA had to face a lot of reaction from inside their
own country and even an internal revolt. Ernst Thommen feared the ban on
matches might have deleterious impact on the Swiss football association’s
authority70 and the revolt caused part of the Swiss public to react against
the differences in treatment by FIFA of towns in the American zone in
contrast to those in the French zone, notably in the Saar,71 where similar
matches were organised between German and French towns.72 The Zürich
paper Sport instigated a call for donations by the public to pay the clubs’
fine, and the sum was raised within days. Keeping the pressure on and
taking advantage of the emergence of a new state, Swiss officials – with
others – succeeded in getting Germany readmitted to FIFA in the early
1950s. Symbolically, Switzerland moreover was the first team to play
against the national team of the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG),
on 22 November 1950 in Stuttgart.
The resentments left over from the Second World War faded, only to be
replaced by a new antagonism between Europeans, namely the East–West
divide. In 1948, with the ‘Prague coup’ (the communist takeover in Czecho-
slovakia) and the start of the Berlin Blockade, the break between the two sides
appeared complete. Football was no exception in this context as very few
matches were organised between 1949 and 1954 during this first stage of ten-
sions in the Cold War. A change in Soviet diplomacy resulting from the death
of Stalin, allowed the first rapprochement between East and West,73 which
had furthermore been anticipated by Swiss leaders as the Swiss national
team was the first team to resume matches against a team from the East,
Hungary as it turned out, in the second half of 1952. In addition, Swiss offi-
cials were sometimes called upon to act as mediators between the two sides, as
was the case for Ernst Thommen when the FIFA Executive Committee gave
him the task of settling a dispute between Spain and Hungary over a
player, Lazlo Kubala.74 The administrator from Basel went on to play an
active role in setting up a continent-wide football organisation, established
in June 1954, which was unique in the emerging post-war European settle-
ment, since it included member countries from both sides of the Iron
Curtain.75
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Ernst Thommen and the creation of UEFA
The authors of the commemorative books on UEFA highlight the work of
Ottorino Barassi, José Crahay and Henri Delaunay in setting up the organis-
ation. While these people were central and, from Spring 1952, were members
of the standing committee whose initial aim was to achieve a synthesis of the
proposals from several associations on the reorganisation that was taking
place at that time within FIFA,76 other European stakeholders became
involved in the project, such as the Englishman Sir Stanley Rous and Switzer-
land’s Ernst Thommen. In the 1963 edition of the UEFA handbook, José
Crahay mentions the contribution of Thommen in bringing together the
European Associations and notes that, alongside Barassi, Delaunay, Meert
and Rous, he ‘provided input during [the meeting of European Associations
in Zurich in May 1952] and [his] experience regarding the establishment of
the future European organisation’.77
Chairman of the ASFA from 1947 to 1954, Ernst Thommen had been a
central figure in Swiss football since the 1930s78 until his accidental death
in 1967. He was also involved in sports management more generally as he
was head of Sport Toto, the company running sports betting in Switzerland.
As Heidrun Homburg noted, he had a strong interest in international foot-
ball79 and as such was indispensable within FIFA in the early 1950s.
Alongside Barassi and Rous, he was part of the new FIFA elite replacing the
Rimet–Seeldrayers–Mauro triumvirate. From this position, Thommen was to
prove very active in the restructuring phase that the Federation underwent
and ‘imposed’ Kurt Gassmann, a former secretary of the ASFA, as Ivo
Schricker’s replacement when the latter retired at the end of 1950,80 despite
the hundred or so other applications for the post. He even managed to
repeat the trick by proposing Hans Bangerter as deputy secretary, and then
in harness with Gassmann, made every effort to find FIFA a new headquar-
ters, which were finally officially opened in 1955, overlooking Zürich.
Like his British and Italian counterparts, Thommen recognised the need to
revise, or rather adapt the structure of FIFA to new developments happening
in football across the world and also to the new political configuration emer-
ging with the start of decolonisation and its corollary, namely the increasing
dilution of the relative weight of European countries in the International Fed-
eration’s constituent bodies. With this in mind, on several occasions, he raised
the issue of the creation of a European-wide body. For example, in March
1952 at a meeting of the executive committee, he noted that ‘the draft Statutes
did not adequately safeguard the legitimate interests of European football
associations and called for their interests to be taken into account’.81 A few
months later, at a meeting in Paris that brought together several European
associations,82 he sent a note to the Assembly both to give his apologies for
absence and to assert his support for the idea of forming a union of European
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federations, since the idea seemed ‘worthy of recommendation to protect both
the individual interests of each association belonging to the European
sphere – and their interests in common’,83 even though he added that the
authority of FIFA must be respected. Finally, at the Extraordinary Congress
of 1953, which saw a complete overhaul of the organisation’s statutes,
Thommen played a fundamental role in closing the gap between the ideas
of the South Americans and the Europeans, by proposing a compromise in
the Assembly on the composition of the executive committee – a separate allo-
cation of seats for European members – which was ratified by Congress.
Reflecting the importance of the Swiss administrator in the creation of a
European Confederation, its founding Congress, originally scheduled to be
held in Bern84 on the coat-tails of the World Cup finals that were being
hosted by Switzerland85 (yet another testimony to the country’s role in inter-
national football), was actually held in Thommen’s home city of Basel. That is
why he opened the discussions by stating that he would like the Assembly to
set ‘an example of a united Europe’,86 a phrase capturing the sense of the foot-
balling ventures of Swiss leaders since the inter-war years. The creation and
development of UEFA as a key institution in the structuring of European foot-
ball87 demonstrated once again the strong commitment of top Swiss admin-
istrators. This was confirmed by the appointment in the late 1950s of Hans
Bangerter as general secretary of UEFA replacing Pierre Delaunay, and
then by the transfer of its headquarters from Paris to Bern. Finally, in 1961,
the new president of the UEFA, was no other than the Swiss Gustav Wieder-
kehr, succeeding the Dane Ebbe Schwartz as a mark of continuity, since a
representative of one ‘small’ footballing country, also neutral on the inter-
national stage, was replaced by another, a sign that in a Union whose compo-
sition is at the very least atypical, these countries are well placed to facilitate
communication and exchange.
Conclusion
This article has drawn attention to how top officials of Swiss football made
their country’s international dimension a major aim of their actions.
Thanks to them, Swiss football exists on the international stage, over and
above its sometimes uneven results on the sports field, and has left its mark
on the transformation of European football.
Additionally, our analyses highlight the complexity of different political
and geopolitical configurations, and provide evidence of successive conver-
gences or divergences that can exist between the interests of sports adminis-
trative bodies and those of political authorities. This finding requires further,
finer-grained analysis of the relationship between sport and international
politics. As such, it would mean focusing more on the actions and motivations
of the main sporting actors in the period of study, in order to identify the
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degree of autonomy that sport maintains vis-à-vis the state. Such an approach
would eventually provide a better understanding of the whys and conditions
of possibility of certain achievements.
Finally, in terms of Swiss historiography, the domain of football has pro-
vided further evidence of the ambiguity of Swiss neutrality on the inter-
national stage. Indeed, whereas the actions of the top officials in its
footballing institutions seemed to embody the outward-looking character of
Switzerland’s cultural diplomacy, they remained nonetheless under govern-
ment supervision,88 and government reactions could vary in firmness depend-
ing on the urgency of the context of international tensions. It should be added
that the position adopted in this paper resonates with the approach outlined
by the Swiss historian Hans Ulrich Jost. In a programmatic article published
in 1998, he suggested that writing the history of Switzerland required going
beyond the national framework because not doing so entails a ‘loss of meth-
odological and epistemological perspective [and also tends to blur] both the
complexity of the social dimension as well as supranational interdependen-
cies’.89 In this context, football as a transnational object undoubtedly has a
role to play.
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